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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of the Paraguayan economy over the last decade is
analyzed in terms of the expansion of agricultural production and an increase
in construction activity. Construction of the Itaipu Dam, the world's
largest hydroelectric project, has provided employment and spurred private
construction. A government colonization program and spontaneous Brazilian
immigration has brought new land into production. Favorable international
prices for Paraguayan exports and funds from the Itaipu project swelled
foreign reserves and served to maintain the Paraguayan currency at an
already overvalued rate. The paper argues that the overvaluation, com-
bined with extensive smuggling, undermined incentives for investment in
manufacturing and deprived the government of revenues needed to finance
infrastructure for sustained economic growth and development.

EXPANSION OF THE ECONOMIC FRONTIER:
Paraguayan Growth in the 1970 's*
by
Werner Baer and Melissa H. Birch
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Introduction
Rapid economic growth of small Less Developed Countries (LDC's)
can be achieved most easily by outward-oriented strategies. The
main reason for this is the small market, which makes an import-
substitution growth strategy net economically feasible. The
outward-oriented models, in turn, can take various forms. If
the country is richly endowed with one or more primary products,
for which there is a growing world demand, emphasis on growth based
on the exportation of these products will result in a classic
primary export economy, which is subject to economic cycles
emanating from the customer countries. Another strategy, especially
of small overpopulated countries (like Hong Kong, Singapore,
Puerto Rico) is to attract foreign firms to import semi-finished
goods in order to add labor-intensive value and re-export, and/or
to have local entrepreneurs engage in such activities. Such a
strategy also subjects the economy to the vicissitudes of outside
economic cycles, but it may have the advantage of 'diversifying the
economy's structure and increasing the country's human resource
endowment. A third strategy is to join other countries of the
same geographical region in a common market, which would enable the
small country to participate in a regional import-substitution
program. Sucn a strategy requires common market partners who would
also be unable to follow import-substitution by themselves.
Paraguay does not totally fit into these categories. It is a
small country, especially population-wise (3.5 million inhabitants
• This paper was written during the authors' stay at the
Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociologicos . We wish to thank the
director, Domingo Rivaroia, and the associate director, Grazzieila
Corvalan, for tneir encouragements and help.
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in 1983). Although it has a large land base (406,752 km ) relative
to its population, much of the land is unsuitable for agriculture,
given present technology, and is without known mineral wealth. The
gigantic neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, followed their own import-
substitution program, thus making an effective common market virtually
impossible. Finally, given the country's physical isolation and
difficult transportation condition, and its small and relatively
unskilled population, there was little attraction for foreign firms
to use the country as a value added base for imported semi-f inished
products which would be subsequently reexported.
In spite of these obstacles, Paraguay experienced rapid growth
in the 1970 's. This was based on a combination of special circumstances,
derived mainly from the country's proximity to two of Latin America's
largest, most dynamic, and also most unstable economies. It is our
purpose to examine and interpret Paraguay's growth performance in
order to gain new insights into the possibilities and limits for small
country growth and development.
Brief Historical Background
Landlocked and without reasonable amounts of gold or other precious
metals, Paraguay was of little interest to the Spanish crown after its
discovery in the mid-sixteenth century. Geographically removed from
Buenos Aires and left alone to settle the northern portion of the
Rio de la Plata basin, the conquistadores turned to agriculture to
guarantee their subsistance and made use of local Indian labor to clear
the land and plant crops. The rural lifestyle that developed resulted
in a high level of cross-cultural interaction that gave way in
2
succeeding years to a quite homogeneous, bilingual mestizo population.
Paraguayan independence was accomplished in 1511 with relatively
little bloodshed and the country entered into a 40-year period of
.-.ear autarky under its first president, Gaspar R. de Francia, wno
severed relations with nearly ail foreign countries and concentrated
-3-
on developing local resources and small artisan workshops. The two
Lopez administrations that followed protected the national base in
the agricultural sector, while opening Paraguay to foreign investment,
4
especially in basic infrastructure. This sixty-year period of
economic growth was brought to an end by the devastating war of the
Triple Alliance which left Paraguay's economy and society in ruins.
In order to pay the war debt Paraguay saw itself forced to sell
government-owned lands to foreign investors, who exploited forest and
agricultural resources. Argentine interests came to dominate the
political, economic and cultural life of the country, a situation that
continued well into the 20th century.
With the onset of the Chaco War against Bolivia (1932-35),
Paraguay was again forced to divert resources from productive uses.
While physical infrastructure was left intact, the war was costly in
human and political terms. Political turmoil, reflecting in great
part differing views on the handling of economic affairs, continued
until 1954, when General Alfredo Stroessner came to power by a
.. .. 6
military coup.
With the aid of an IMF mission in the late 1950' s, the government
was able to bring inflation under control and to stabilize the
currency (the Guarani) at an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar
(126 Guaranis to the dollar). Foreign aid was ample and basic
physical infrastructure was gradually expanded.
The Economy in the Early Sixties
Examining Paraguay in the early sixties, one finds an open,
agriculture-oriented economy, with a low per capita income (US$ 168
in 1962 at current prices) . In 1960 agriculture accounted for almost
39 percent of GDP and 55 percent of the economically active population.
Besides producing subsistance goods, the sector was the major foreign
exchange earner; wood, livestock and quebracho extract (tanin)
accounted for more than 60 percent of export receipts. Industry
contributed 17.3 percent to the GDP, employing 15 percent of the
work force, and over 75 percent of its value added originated in
agro-industries. Cf the less than 6,000 establishments in 1963, 85
-4-
percent were individually owned, 63 percent had between 2 and 4
g
employees, and close to 70 percent had no mechanical power. The
openness of Paraguay's economy is shown by its trade/GDP ratio:
exports of goods and services amounted to 12.6 percent and imports
to 14.7 percent in 1962. Imports in the early sixties consisted of
manufactured goods, wheat and fuel, and originated mainly from
the country's major trading partners - Argentina, the United States
and the EEC.
With savings and investments hovering around 12 to 13 percent
of GDP, the average growth rate of real GDP in the sixties was
4.2 percent per year, while population was growing at an annual
rate of 2.5 percent.- After the financial chaos of the 1947-54 period,
when the average annual inflation rate was 50 percent, stability
was restored and in the sixties the country experienced price
stability tthe cost of living rising at an average of 2 percent
per year) and total exchange rate stability, as the country stuck to
the same pegged exchange of 126 Guaranis to the dollar.
Three Determinants of Paraguay's Economic Performance in the 197Q's
The 1970 's were characterized by a substantial upsurge in the
economy's growth rate, averaging 8 percent per year. The driving
force behind this growth came from two sectors - agriculture and
construction. The former was the result of the expansion of the
agricultural frontier and the latter of the surge of construction
on various infrastructure projects, culminating in the building of
Itaipu (jointly with Brazil), the world's largest hydroelectric
project. These two leading sectors had a unique impact on the nature
of the economy's growth, while the exchange rate policy pursued
also affected the pattern cf the allocation of incremental resources
in a significant way. To fully understand the nature of Paraguay's
growtn in the 1970 's, it is important to analyze in greater detail
the three relevant policy areas: agricultural colonization, the
construction cf hydroelectric capacity, and exchange rate policies.
-5-
1 . Expansion cf the Agricultural Frontier
Prior to the 1960 's Paraguay's population and economic activities
were located in the capital city and its surroundings. In 1950 more
than 60 percent of the population could be found in Asuncion and
9
within a radius of about 100 miles. Rural activity in this area
was characterized by a minifundio structure, i.e. an abundance of tiny,
family-owned plots. For instance, in 1962 Cordillera, onf of the
minifundia departments, had a population density of 38 persons per km
,
while the national average was 4.5. Attempts to expand agricultural
output by resettling farmers to the vast areas of unutilized lands
date back to the 1870 's. It was not until the early 1960's, however,
with the founding of the IBR (Instituto de Bienestar Rural - Rural
Welfare Institute) (1963) and the opening of the highway linking Asuncion
to Brazil, that any serious progress was made to decongest the traditional
minifundia area. The IBR is an autonomous government agency charged
with carrying out the government land settlement program. Between
1963 and 1973 42,000 families were resettled by that institute; of
these 30 percent were relocated to the Eastern frontier region. By the
end of 1976 almost 90,000 land titles had been issued, covering about
4 million hectares of land. However, the ability of colonists to
effectively exploit their new' properties was hampered by the lack of
adequate infrastructure, roads, credit and technical assistance.
In the 1970 's Paraguay's colonists were joined by large numbers
of Brazilian and Japanese farmers, who came to the area in response to
a numcer of economic stimuli: low land prices, high world soybean and
cotton prices, low taxes and favorable treatment of agricultural exports.
The Japanese colonists were supported by assistance from the Japanese
government. Brazil's colonists were able to take advantage of prior
agricultural experience and superior access to credit. These
spontaneous colonization activities came to overwhelm I3R-directed
programs
.
The frontier lands were mainly used to produce export crops,
especially cotton and soyoeans. In the period 1972-9 soybean output
-6-
increased by 350 percent and cotton by 470 percent, while domestic
crops grew by only 23 percent. In 1972 cotton represented 6 . 4 percent
of the value of Paraguay's crop output, wnile in 1979 it had grown to
16.4 percent; soybeans' share increased from 6.2 percent to 17 percent
14in the same period. In contrast, the output of mandioca (cassava)
,
one of Paraguay's major domestic staples, in 1979 was 25 percent smaller
than in 1970 and its share of output in Paraguay's crop production fell
from 22.6 percent to 14 percent. It will also be noted in Table 3 tnat
tne share of cotton in total exports rose from 1.1 percent in 1960 to
43.7 percent in 1981 and soybeans from zero to 16.1 percent.
The frontier region comprises 14 percent of Paraguay's land
area and roughly 28 percent of the economically usable land; it was
responsible for 30 percent of the country's land area devoted to
scyneans and 35 percent devoted to cotton in 1979 isee Table 13)
.
There can be little douot that the expanded agricultural frontier
contributed to Paraguay's economic growth. Previously idle land was
brougnt under cultivation and much of it produced export crops for
which there was a rapidly expanding world market.
The highway to Brazil and the development of the lands in the
f rentier region substantially reduced Paraguay's traditional dependence
en Argentina as its trade route. It will be noted in Table 3 that
whereas only .2 percent cf Paraguay's exports went to Brazil in 1960
and .8 percent of imports tfame from there, by 1981 the respective
percentages were 18.3 and 2 5.9. Even trade with the U.S. and Europe
r.cw had an alternative route. This regional trade diversification gave
Paraguay an increasing amount of economic and political leverage in
16its international economic and political contacts."
It is also of interest to note that availaole data suggest a
negative linkage effect caused by the agricultural frontier development.
Cr.e notes in Table 3 aj that wnile vegetable oils accounted for 11
percent of exports in 19 70, by 1961 they had snrunx to ~.6 percent. In
lignt of the previously mentioned increase in soycean output,
can only infer that an increasing portion of this proauct is
being exported as raw materials, with little value added.
Another impact of the expanding agricultural frontier was on
the regional distribution of the population, whose changes are
shown in Table 12. Whereas 18.3 percent of the population lived
in the frontier regions in 1962, by 1982 this share had grown to
27.3 percent. Asuncion's share remained relatively stable, while
the minifundio region's share fell from 40.5 to 34.2 percent.
Unlike many other LDC ' s , Paraguay did not experience a marked
rural-urban migration, but rather a rural-rural movement, out of
the traditional minifundia regions to the newly opened lands. One
might think that this presented Paraguay with an advantage, as it
avoided the urban population explosion, so common in many other
LDC ' s . That is, it avoided the massive demand for expensive urban
infrastructure, or the socio-political tensions arising from its
neglect
.
These positive aspects, however, have to be weighed against
problems arising from the neglect of rural infrastructure. A World
3ank study found that "...The lack of adequate transport infrastructure
is a major factor depressing small farmer incomes. Where physical
access is difficult, product prices received by farmers are reduced
by high transport costs, the quasi-monopsonistic situation that often
develops because of a limited number of buyers, and the farmer's
need to sell soon after the crops are harvested to avoid losses due to
lack of storage facilities. Similarly, cost of inputs and other
necessities are increased since the middleman is often the supplier
of inputs and source of financing. Even when access to institutional
credit is possible, the small settler often does not know about the
procedures required to secure a loan, or cannot provide adequate
guarantees, since it is likely that he does not possess a land
title. " '
Since IBR settlement did not automatically confer permanent
title to the land, small landholders have often been evicted. Usually
occuring after the land had been cleared, the evictions frequently
a-
benefitted large landowners, including Brazilians and multinational
firms. The well-known Paraguayan scholar, Dr. Domingo Rivarola, has
brought some further insights into the socio-economic development
resulting from the frontier region expansion. He stated that: "Highly
capitalized commercial agricultural businesses have become an efficient
mechanism for increasing the volume of agricultural production, but
have simultaneously brought about a secondary result of singular
importance to the traditional peasant economy: the definitive
limitation of their movement toward the extensive - and now disappeared
1
8
land reserves of Eastern and Northeastern Paraguay."
2 . Growth through Construction.
Another major source of growth in the 1970' s was the construction
with Brazil of the gigantic hydro-electric dam, called Itaipu.
For some 200 kms the Parana river forms the border between
Paraguay and Brazil. Until the 1970 's, however, its hydroelectric
potential remained unexploited. In 1973 Paraguay and Brazil signed
a treaty for the construction of Itaipu, destined to be the world's
largest hydroelectric facility, with an installed capacity of
12,000 MW. Later in the same year Paraguay signed a similar treaty
with Argentina to build another dam further downstream on the Parana
river, called Yacyreta (4,040 MW) . The latter project was postponed
a number of times. Paraguay's planners were hoping to have construction
begun on Yacyreta as Itaipu would rdown in the early 1980 's.
The Itaipu treaty provided for the construction and administration
of the project by a jointly-run binational firm - Itaipu Binacional -
owned in equal parts by Paraguay's utility company ANDE and its
Brazilian counterpart, Eletrobras. The enterprise was to be run by
an equal number of Paraguayan and Brazilian directors, and loans
contracted by the binational firm in international capital markets
wouid be guaranteed by the Brazilian government.
Given the "...manifest interest of the two governments in
.-.aximizing the utilization of the technical expertise of the two
-9-
.,19 . .
,countries... , civil construction contracts were let to one
Paraguayan and one Brazilian consortium of construction companies.
Each consortium was to hire workers in its own country. Contracts
tor the electro-mechanical equipment were given to various firms
"...with the purpose of attaining the highest rate of participation
of Paraguayan and Brazilian industries...""
Once completed, the energy produced would be sold by Itaipu
Binacional to the electric companies of the respective participating
countries. Its price was established in U.S. dollars, pegged to gold.
The project began in 1974. According to a study carried out by
2 1
the Paraguayan government , construction of Itaipu was expected to
employ more than 11,000 workers at the height of activity in 1976,
half of whom would be Paraguayan. In fact, employment reached a
peak of 3 1,318 workers in 1978, of whom only 43 percent were Paraguayan.
In addition, 57 percent of Paraguayan workers were in the lowest-
skilled level, while only 38 percent of the Brazilian workers fell into
2 2that category. "
Original estimates of the cost of Itaipu were around L'.S.S 2 billion
while in the early 1980' s it was expected to reach U S 5 13 billion
(which manes the cost of Itaipu close to 3 times the GDP of
23Paraguay) .
It has been estimated that between 1977 and 1980 approximately
US 5 250 million were spent in Paraguay per year. This inflow of funds
provided liquidity to the banking system, markedly increasing the
availability of credit and placing downward pressure on the cost of
foreign exchange i, a n aspect to be discussed more fully in the next
section) .
The construction activity represented a huge increase in demand
tor labor. The construction sector grew at annual rates of 26 percent
in the period 19 75-3; it reached a peak of 32 percent in 1978 (see
Table 6). This reflected not only the construction of tne dam, but
also the boom in private residential construction and public spending
on buildings and other infrastructure."
10-
Linkages co other sectors of the economy were weaker. Vh i I e
cement output expanded from 103,00 tons in 197 U to 15 b, 100 tons in
1981, official figures for the same period snow that the value of
cement imports rose from USS 3,000 to US$ 8.b million." Non-
metallic minerals as a proportion of total industrial production
increased by only .5 percent between 1970 and 1981. Reuuced and
nearly obsolete capacity of the country's only cement plant
(a state-owned monopoly), the lack of adequate transportation
facilities from the plant to the dam site, and an active trade in
contraband cement, prevented a fuller utilization of the domestic
potent ial .
The l3ck of linkages was not limited ^.o cement. Overall,
industry's snare of total GDP declined from 1 b . b percent in L 9 7 2
to l-t.2 percent in 19 3 1 - see Table 1 b).
An lie industrial linkages were w e a < , the 1 inkaees to tne
service sector were notably stronger, and were also reinforced
by the impact of the expanding agricultural frontier. Hign levels
of employment in the 1970's, coupled with the availability of
consumer credit" and a favorable exchange rate (see the following
section), led to a rapid expansion of commercial activity. Small
private " f i na nc i e r as " opened and some of the larger retail
establishments created their own credit plans for consumers. Uh i 1 e
in 1972 there were only o banks in Asuncion, by 1981 there were
20, many with branches in cities of tne interior (especially in
the expanding frontier area). Plentiful foreign exchange permitted
the import of a variety of consumer goods, as many world-famous
srand names found representation in Paraguay. Commerce and
finance grew at annual rates of over 10 percent in the L 9 7 6 - 8
period. By 1981 commercial and financial services accounted for
26 percent of GDP.
Vhile ItaiDu construction created a substantial increase in
In-
effective demand, an increase in the supply of domestic consumer
goods was not immediately forthcoming and the excess demand was
only partially met by increased imports. This situation, in combination
with increased liquidity, resulted in inflationary pressures. Between
1965 and 1970 the cost-of -living had increased at annual rates
ranging between 3.8 and -.1 percent. By the late seventies, however,
Paraguay experienced double-digit inflation, which reached 28.2
percent in 1979. Annual rates of inflation have subsequently declined,
reflecting slack, demand, tight monetary policy (see Table 9) and,
perhaps, more reliable supplies as contraband trade became
institutionalized .
Located some 350 kms. from Asuncion, Itaipu's construction
created a new growth pole. Thousands of workers in a new area implied
the need for provision of goods and services. The city of Ciudad
Pres. Stroessner developed as a commercial center to serve those
needs and also the incipient tourist industry. Sawmills located in
the area to process timber as land was cleared and primary product
processing plants, mostly for the local market, were beginning to
appear in the early 1980's. Thus the migration to the frontier
departments, as discussed in the previous section, was due not only
to the expanding agricultural frontier, but also to the opportunities
associated directly and indirectly with Itaipu.
3 . T he Im pac t__o_f Exc h an z e Rate S t ab ility.
Paraguay's exchange rate was fixed at 126 Guaranis to the U.S.
dollar in 1961 and was not altered until the 1980's. Given the
relative internal price stability that prevailed until the 1970's,
there was no threat of overvaluation vis-a-vis the world's major
currencies, especially the U.S. dollar. This was often the case with
other countries in Latin America which experienced high rates of
inflation and rigidities in exchange rate adjustments. However, the
economic instability of such important trading partners as Argentina
and Brazil had some notable impact on Paraguay. Both partners
experienced periodic inflation with lagging exchange rate adjustments
vis-a-vis the dollar.
V.'henever the neighbor's currency became overvalued, Paraguay's
12-
imports would became more expensive, while its exports would become
more competitive, and tourism from Argentina and/or Erazil would
2 7increase. Thus the undervaluation of the Guarani relative to the
neighbors' currencies would act as a stimulant to exports of goods
and services, but would also threaten domestic financial stability
as import prices would rise.
The overvaluation of the Guarani in the 1970's, on the other
hand, made imports increasingly attractive and placed a downward
pressure on the cost of living. It provided a subsidy for the
importation of capital goods, but this had little effect in stimulating
industrial growth as the domestic market for manufactured goods was
small and imported manufactured consumer goods, also made cheaper
2 8by overvaluation, were too competitive for local substitutes. We
should erapnasize that in spite of the cheapness of imported goods due
to exchange overvaluation, a large contraband import trade flourished
due to high tariffs, required payments of taxes and commissions, and
to complex administrative procedures, which made the resulting
effective exchange rate less attractive.
In theory, the increased overvaluation of the Guarani should
nave caused exports to decline as they became less competitive. In
fact, however, these expectations did not materialize. First, with
rising prices in international commodity markets the impact of the
overvaluation was mitigated. Second, an increasing amount of exports
was permitted in the free floating exchange market. Third, contraband
trade flourished.
With growing inflation in the second half of the seventies, the
adherence to the fixed exchange rate began to have increasingly
perverse effects on the country's allocation of resources. One major
impact of the Guarani' s overvaluation was this accelerated growth of
contraband trade. As domestic prices were rising, it became increasingly
unremunerative to export legally. It was increasingly attractive
to exchange dollars earned in contraband at the free market rate, which
hovered around 130 to 1-0 Guaranis to the dollar in the second half of
Che 19 70's. But even tnis rate was overvalued in the late 1970's
13-
because the building of 1 1 a i p u and the concommitant inn low oi
. . . . 29large quantities or roreign capital. Another motive for contraband
was the avoidance ot" export taxes. Also, one should take into account
that Paraguay's exports consisted of primary goods, which are easier
to channel through unofficial markets than manufactured products.
Contraband trade became so prominent that most Paraguayan and
international balance of payments analysts pay only slight attention
to official export and import data. Table 5 presents various orders
of magnitude of contraband trade. Part a), which contains Wo rid
Ea n k estimates, shows an ever-widening gap between official trade
data and estimates based on partner country information and on data
from free floating exchange transactions volume. Part b) shows
the divergence between Paraguayan data and that oi its three major
trading partners. It is thus quite likely that the degree o i openness
of the Paraguayan economy is more than twice as large as revealed by
export and import/GDP ratios of Table 7; i.e., in the period 19 7 0-81
the export /GDP ratio could have averaged around 2 6 to 30 percent
instead of 13 percent and the import/GOP ratio about 35 instead of
18 percent, ranking Paraguay's economy among the most open in the
world.
The fixed exchange rate policy, with its resulting overvaluation
of the Guarani, also had some general deleterious macro-effects. This
becomes clear when one considers that one-third of government revenues
come from taxes on international trade and that public sector revenue
as a percent of GDP fell from 1 •* . 7 percent in 1972 to 12.2 percent
in 1981 (see Table 8). Thus the contraband trade deprived the
public sector of necessary funds to finance infrastructure necessities.
For example, the geographic expansion of the economy increased the
need for access-roads to bring products from the new agricultural lands
to the market. As the government had few resources to build such
roads, only private companies were able to manage adequately as they
30built their own road system. The peasants were thus rorced to sell
it ljwer prices to middlemen.
uOne should also consider che country's pressing needs for
social infrastructure. It will be noted in T <* b 1 e 11 that only
22 percent of the population had access to piped water and 11
percent had access to sewer services. Vhile in the Asuncion area
the infant mortality rate dropped from 73.1 per 1,000 in 1970-2
to 63.1 in 1974-7, in the interior the rate remained at 96 per
1,00 0. An already precarious social infrastructure is constantly
worsening due to the high population growth rate of 3.2 percent
per year. The growing contraband trade has limited the rise of
government revenues and has thus curtailed the provison of adequate
services to raise the stanaard of living of the bulk of Paraguay's
21popular ion.
1 '"
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- - c J " o m y in the Early 1 9 S ' s
r h e agricultural expansion and the construction activities in
the 1970's increased the growth of real GDP from an annual average
rate of 4.2 percent in the sixties to 8.3 percent in the seventies, the
rate Deing over 10 percent in the 1976-31 period. The GDP of 1931
was roughly USS 4.4 billion and the per capita GDP reached about
USS 1,372. However, given the great concentration of income, this
number obviouslv did not reflect the standard of living of the
average Paraguayan. A glance at the social indicators in Table 11
shows that in spite of some improvements in the life expectancy and
the literacy rate, the bulk of the Paraguayan population continued to
Live on a fairly low standard. One should also consider thac despite
the increased jemanc for labor in the boom years, real wages in 1931
were slightly lower than in 1975.
The structure of the economy underwent some notable changes.
The share of agriculture decreased to 27.8 percent in 1981. Though
>ne of the dynamic sectors was to found in agriculture, one should
recail Chat oniv frontier agriculture expanded rapidly, while
traditional agriculture stagnated. 2y 1977 employment in agriculture
l a c i eciined 43.3 percent of Che labor force and it is most likely
15-
Chac in the early eighties this proportion was slightly over 40
percent. It should be noted that in the well-known Kuznets cross-
country study of economic structures the expected share of agriculture
—
*
in GDP tor a country at the per capita^ income level of Paraguay
was 20.5 percent and the expected employment share was 37.9 percent.
Thus Paraguay's agricultural GDP s .re is well above the "normal",
indicating the dynamic role of that sector in the country's growth.
In the 1960-81 period the share of industry in GDP had decreased
sl-ightly and the employment share had risen only a little. Both
shares were substantially below the Kuznets expected shares of
34 percent of GDP and 30 percent of employment.
The most pronounced changes in the GDP shares can be found in
construction and in comme rce / f
i
nance , the former rising from 2.2 to
6.6 percent and the latter from 18.4 to 26.6 percent. The alternative
GDP estimates in part b) of Table 1 have construction reaching 13.1
percent of GDP in 1981. Employment in construction had risen from
3.3 percent in 1962 to 5.6 percent in 1977 by official estimates, and,
according to Inter-American Bank estimates this proportion had risen
to almost 15 percent by 1980. The share of employment in commerce
rose from 7.1 percent in 1962 to 13.2 percent in 1977, and probably
exceeded 15 percent in the early eighties.
A glance at the macro ratios in Table 7 show a more than doubling
of the fixed i nv e s tme n t
/
GDP ratio, from an average of 15 percent in
the early 1970' s to an average of over 30 percent in the late 1 9 7 ' s /
early 1980's. This was partially financed by domestic savings, which
rose from an average of 13 percent of GDP in the early 1970's to 25
percent in the late 1 9 70 ' s /ear ly 1980's. The notable increase in
private savings can be explained by the expanding incomes in the boom
years and the increased raonetization of the economy. The major
beneficiaries of growth (the higher income groups) with their higher
marginal propensity to save, took advantage of higher real interest
rates, the existence of new financial instruments and the expanding
3 8
number of banks and " f
i
nanc i e r a s " .
16-
Foreign savings, which were negligible in the earlv I970's,
financed about 25 percent of investments in the 1979-31 period. It
should also be noted in Table 8 that over the 1972-81 period the presence
of the public sector in the economy declined. The limited role of the
government explains the modest increase of the foreign debt in the
3 91970 s when compared to most Latin American countries.
Cone 1 u_s_i_ons
After long periods of stagnation Paraguay achieved very rapid
growth by exploiting its relatively empty spaces through agricultural
production and construction. Besides growth, this strategy contributed
to the deconcentration of the country's population and economic
activity, and also to the diversification of exports and of
markets. The latter was important in decreasing Paraguay's dependence
on Argentina as the sole economic corridor to the outside world.
Important contributory factors to these developments were the
favorable world trade situation of the 1 9 7 ' s , the large availability
of finance from world capital markets, and the domestic political
stability. The latter, combined with high economic growth rates,
also contributed to substantial increases in the country's saving
capacity .
Paraguay failed to take full advantage of this growth because
of the government's unwillingness to play a larger role in the economy.
The insistence on maintaining a fixed exchange rate Cwhich became
increasingly overvalued), on relying on market forces to allocate
resources, and on keeping the activities of the state restrained by
the revenue produced by the existing tax structure, limited the
government's influence in the economy. The overvalued exchange rate
resulted in cheap imports, discouraging local industrial development
and thus limiting the backward and forward linkage potential of the
new exports. It also discouraged "official" exports and encouraged
-ontraband trade. The latter consisted of raw materials with no
value added, i.e. no forward linkage.
The small growth of government revenues impeded the construction
of adequate infrastructure which, in turn, hampered domestic vertical
linkages. This explains, in part, the dearth of any pronounced linkage
17-
effects of Itaipu. Also contributing to the latter's Low backward
linkages was the underdeveloped industrial structure resulting from a
history of cheap imports.
In other words, the institutional weakness (or underdevelopment)
of the public sector caused a relatively weak economic repercussion
effect from the two motor forces of the economy - frontier agriculture
and construction. The linkage weaknesses also led to a distorted use
of a large proportion of increased savings, which were invested in
commerce (to distribute imported goods)
,
and residential and commercial
construction.
The ercpnasis on construction produced a relatively distorted
economic structure, as an unusually large percentage of the GDP
and work force were devoted to that sector. It was hoped that the
construction of Yacyreta would chronologically follow Itaipu and
thus keep these factors of production fully employed. The temporary
delay of Yacyreta in the early 1 9 8 ' s , creating a large amount of
unemployment and idle capacity, only foreshadows what may be expected
from such emphasis on construction without the type of structural
changes in the economy which could produce a substantial number of
vertical repercussion effects.
Paraguay's growth was inequitable as the broad mass of its
population did not benefit. Real wages declined, the new lands fell
into the hands of privileged individuals and firms (both domestic
and foreign!, and the construction of social infrastructure lagged
behind the country's needs.
The opening of the Eastern frontier, the diversification of
exports and of markets contributed to a decline of the country's
traditional dependency. On the other hand, Itaipu and Yacyreta will
lock the country into a new kind of dependency, as markets for
electricity exports are rigid in destination and sales are dependent
in the economic fortunes of Erazil and Argentina.
In the framework of small LDC development possibilities,
Paraguay's position is such that it must exploit its natural resources
to promote growth ana development. 3ecomine a base for industrial
value added activities is unrealistic in the short-tun because of
Che country's location. We have shown that in order to achieve
development, rather than just growth, it is important to produce
adequate institutional structures which are capable of taking
advantage of favorable international market conditions.
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Table 1
a) Paraguay: Sectoral Conposition of GDP
(at current prices) (percentages)
1960 1970 1975 1930 1981
\griculture 38.8 32.1 36.9 29.5 27.3
Mining .1 .1 .2 .4 .4
Indu3t ry 17.3 lb.
7
15.6 16.5 16.8
Const ruction 2.4 2.8 3.8 6.1 6.6
Elect rici ty , Gas
,
'.Vater .3 1.1 1.4 2.3 2.2
Transport &
Co inunicition 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.1
Commerce & Fimnce 13.4 24.4 22.9 25.8 2o.G
Government 4.4 5.3 3.4 3.4 3.3
Misc. Services 13.3 13.6 12.0 1] .8 11.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 100.0
Source: Innco Central del Paraguay, Cuentis N.Tcionales
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Table 2
Paraguay: Sectoral Distribution of Economically
\ctive rooulation ( oercentanes )
\griculture
."•lining
Industry
Const ruction
Commerce
Other
Total
106- 1972
100.0 100.0
1977
54.7 49.6 43.5
.1 .1
15.1 13.8 17.7
3.3
.
4.0 5.6
7.1 7.9 13.2
19.7 24.6 20.0
100.0
3ource: Precidencia de ia ."^epublisa, Secretaria Tecnica de Planif icacion
,
Diaqnostico Oemoqrafico Del Paraguay ''1950-1977) , Vo lumen II,
Asoncion , Paraguay , 1080
, p . 337
.
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TViJLe 3
3 ) P-ir~'~u~y/:n Exports: CO''Qfl ltv "on^e-ition
(percent ir;e cistri utior, )
1960 1070 1075 1031
'ode Products 14.9 10.7 lb.O. 1?.3
LivestccK 35." "6./ 19.5 ".3
i'O") 1CC0 5.0 9.0 U.O ~> *>
Cotton 1.1 6.3 11.4 43.7
Joy jeans - - 9.0 lu.I
Sug -r 0.3 - 3.0 -
Vcueta jie Oils 5.7 10.9 u.O 7.(3
Ecsen till Oils 3.7 3 .*"! 5.5 n 1
' ue j racno Ext roc
t
10.9 3.1 I .4 1.9
Other 7.4 "1.1 10.0 11.7
ot.il 190.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: "inco Centnl -el Paraguay, 3oletin 2sfidi g. tico
j ) PiriPuwin Innorts: Co )~oc!ity Co~"O r.ition
( percen t age alst ri'ju t ion )
1C7Q
Food 3."
Other Consumer Goods 14.4
Prim-iry ~nd Intermediate Goods 39.3
Fuels =)nr; Lubricants 16.4
Caoitil Goods 21.7
Total
Source: some as a)
100.0
1001
6 .4
01 .0
17.0
13.3
36.
S
1C0.O
c) Paraauayan Exoorts: Oestimtion
(percentage cistruution
1960 1970 1931
Argentina
Irazil
United States
EEC
Oapan
Other
Total
28 .4
.2
26 .8
27 .0
17 .6
00 .0
27 .4
1 .6
14 o
30 .9
1 .8
24 .1
23 _ ->
18 .3
5 .2
25 .3
8 .4
19 .6
100.1 100.0
Source: same as a)
d ) Piraqujyin Imports: Oria i
n
l"oO 1^-70 1931
10. S
25.9
9.7
17.7
0.3
13.6
Araentina "3.1
Jrazil .3
United States "3.6
-~z 23.7
Ca-an 6 .
5
Other 2".
3
"Ot 3l 1 0.0
Source
:
Sinme is a).
13 .5
3 ~>
23 ,4
29, , 7
6,• 3
IS .4
loo .e ico.o
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araquT/ ; Mtarn itive Tstinne? of T r Tie
f Ul ).1 ) von 1 'ercn indise Trn^e f-iillioi"
;
- o r t s f 1
L97o 1977
fficinl Sstinntos 112.3 °79.4
I.icludinr .ri juctnent s
c rn~ p* rtnrr country
"3t3 234.4 343.7
I eluding \djustments
c rom Exchange Mouses
Dati 331.2 640.2
Iwoojrts [FgTJ
Of ficial Est inn ten "36.3 3to0.1
Including \djustments
fro- Partner Country
Din 315.5 400.5
Including \djustmentc
fr -xchnnge Houses
Din 323.5 "17.3
1078 1979
-»01.5 305.^
421 .2 . 520.3
713.7 1,191.0
432.0 577.1
o7l.i 265.6
012.4 1,404.6
Source: /orld ionk , Economic "e^onndun on P-rruiy , "ectemoer 1931,
o. 89, bised on in'orntion nrovTceo 3"y t h? OOF Division
of tho Central 2 a n k .
b) P-. riqujv.n and "Ttner Country Reports on Tr-;de (million- of U~C )
Pa ro gua y in \rgentiniin F.innusyjn \rgent ini:n
Exnort s to Imnorts from Inrorts from Exports to
'- rrentin n
-•
.
• 14.6
'- jP^quay
15.0
\rcent mo P i fcuiy
1969 12.5 15.3
1970 17.6 10.8 11.8 15.1
1071 17.3 21.1 10.1 9.7
1972 15.7 19.3 10.8 12.9
1973 lb.
2
20.7 27.5 29.7
1074 33.
5
42.9 48.4 51 .6
lO"^ 49.7 50.2 . 33.2 37.3
1976 17.9 2°.
3
37.7 56.4
1977 35.3 35.4 43.2 84.8
1973 24.1 42.7 48.3 127.4
Pa racua yan irazilian Pa raguay :in Orr.zilian
Exoort- to Inoorts from Imports from Exoorts to
Orazii °i riaunv Brazil
1.6
Pa raauav
1069 # 4 6 .6
197C i!i 1.4 2.0 11.3
1971 .3 2.5 5.0 21.5
1077 # 7 6.2 10.4 31.9
1073 2.9 23.0 15.5 60.5
1974 o .0 35.5 23.3 90.0
19/5 6.1 27.3 37.1 lib.
4
1076 ii. a 2/.0 31.2 132.1
1977 Id. 3 33.2 53.9 1S5.
1970 20 .4 -6.5 62.7 2°4.3
J.979 29.1 7 l.J 102.3 324.4
1900 40.2 91.6 140.5 4 »9.2
1021 54.1 101.5 131.2 449. o
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T^ble 5 (cont'd)
b ) P-rarmym ind Pirtner Country Reoorts
(cont'd)
on Trade (millions of U3 f
.)
19/0
197b
19/6
1977
1973
1979
19C0
1331
Sources
Paraguayan United States
Exports to Imports fron
United "it.ite s Pi raguay
9.0
15.0
21.0
aO.O
22.0
17.0
17.0
15.0
11 .0
19 .0
20 .0
24 .0
51 .0
164 .0
81 .0
48 .0
Paraguayan
Imports fron
United 3tites
15.0
22.0
18.0
31.0
35.0
50.0
51.0
49.0
United States
Exports to
Paraguay
18.0
33.0
38.0
51.0
90.0
128.0
109.0
108.0
lanco Central Del Paraguay, Ooletin Estadistico ;
3anco Central do 3rasil, 3oletin j Republic! Argentina,
Ministerio de Scononia
, Sec . ae Prog ramacion y Coordinacion
Econonica, INPEC, Comercio Exterior ; U.S. Depirtment of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical \bstr-ict of
the United States 1982-1983 , ".'ashing ton , D.C., Decemoer 1932
Table 6
Piraguay: Growth Rates (real) of GD n 3nd
Its Components (percentage -;;roivth)
;df \oriculture Industry Construction Commerce
1960- 1970 (ye t rly
;ver^ge) 4.2
1070 \ 4.3 2.2 8.0 7.2
1071 5.4 6.5 1.7 14.3
1072 6.4 6.2 11 .0 2.6
1073 7.2 6.4 3.4 16.5
1074 3.2 9.3 7.4 14.1
1975 6.3 3.2 -1.3 21.2
1976 7.0 3.7 5.5 13.1
1977 12.3 11.1 20.1 31.1
1973 10.9 5.0 13.7 32.0
1079 10.7 o.7 10.5 30.0
19S0 11.4 9.2 12.6 26.0
1031 8.5 b.7 8.0 16.7
1932 -2.5
Courc a • 2>j nco Centr3l Del Paraguay, Cuer a s acionales •
Table 7
f'jcroecono-nc Ratios of Paraguay
( cu rrent prices, % of GOP
)
4.0
6.2
3.1
8.5
8.3
4.4
10.1
12.0
12.0
11.6
10.5
8.4
1962
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1:76
1977
1973
1979
1930
1931
Gross Fixed
Investment
14.5
14.1
16.6
21.3
29.0
22.1
25.4
^7.3
30.5
33.9
34.4
34.7
Savings
Total
13.5
12.0
15.7
20.1
13.9
17.5
29. b
22.3
22.5
25.0
95.
b
25.7
Priva te
3 a v i n a :
Public
Sav.
Foreign
3av
.
14.4
15.4
14.2
14.1
17.1
17.4
15.9
17.7
20.4
22.6
1.3
4.7
4.7
3.4
3.5
5.4
6.6
7.3
5.2
3.1
.9
1.2
3.1
4.6
4.8
5.0
8.1
3.2
3.3
9.0
Exoorts
of' G a 3
12.6
14.9
13.4
13.3
15.0
15.5
13.2
12.4
15.0
13.4
10. 3
9.6
u.7
Imports
of G £
14.7
16.1
16.0
13.".
14.3
17.0
13.7
17.3
20.7
20.6
10.1
18.5
16.1
Source linco Central del P a r 3 g u j y , Cuentaa Macionales a n d "3olet in
E s t a d i s 1 1 c o
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Table 8
Tie Size of Pinnyy's Public Ze~tor
(as percent or cu rrent GDP)
1972 1977 197; 19 79 1900 1981
Public Oector
cvenues 14.7 13.8 14.6 15.0 13.3 1?.?
Cu rrent Exnendi-
tu res 11.8 O.U 8.5 D .4 8.8 9.5
3-irit al Exp
.
5.5 6.3 7.1 5." 5.5 7.1
3ou rcc
:
r.'acioncs Unidas
,
Estudio Econo^icc de '.meri C 1 Litirn
,
1931 .
19o5
1 ~ oU
1967
1968
19o9
1^70
1971
197?
1:73
1974
1975
1376
1977
1978
1979
I960
1981
1932
Ta bl e r
Selected "oneti py in^icitors
( rate G or i
r1
^"-T~~"7ro.•.•:.^, J
Coot of Liv inn "one^ Suoply
3.3 10.4
2.
9
5.1
1.4 4.9
.6 G.2
5.3
-.1 16.4
5.0 10.3
9.2 13.8
12.8 30.4
25.2 24.7
b.7 17.3
4.4 19.1
9.4 42.9
10.6 53.2
28.2 32.0
2? .4 21.8
13.0 -14.1
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